ALL SORRY TO DISAGREE - A GENERAL PRINCIPLE FOR THE PROVISION OF NONRIVAL GOODS

被引:12
作者
MOULIN, H [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV AUTONOMA BARCELONA,BARCELONA,SPAIN
关键词
D O I
10.2307/3440467
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A group of agents with identical rights but different preferences share the cost of a public good. In a situation where each agent is held responsible for his own preferences, the principle says that nobody can benefit from the difference between his and other agents' preferences: all are sorry to disagree. This axiom is incompatible with the "pay according to benefits" approach and, in particular, with Lindahl pricing methods. However, it is compatible with Foley's Stand Alone core constraints. Our axiom, unlike the Stand Alone properties, applies to any number of public goods (or bads), and to arbitrary public decisions.
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页码:37 / 51
页数:15
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