RISK SHARING, SHARECROPPING AND UNCERTAIN LABOR-MARKETS

被引：56

作者：

NEWBERY, DMG

机构：

[1] UNIV CAMBRIDGE,CHURCHILL COLL,CAMBRIDGE,ENGLAND

[2] STANFORD UNIV,STANFORD,CA 94305

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2296910

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：585 / 594

页数：10

共 17 条

[1]

ARROW KJ, 1971, GENERAL COMPETITIVE

[2]

BELL C, 1975, TECHNICAL PROGR TENU

[3]

Cheung S.N., 1969, THEORY SHARE TENANCY

[4]

Diamond PA, 1967, AM ECON REV, V57, P759

[5]

EPSTEIN T, 1967, THEMES ECONOMIC ANTH

[6] OPTIMALITY OF EQUILIBRIUM WHEN MARKET STRUCTURE IS INCOMPLETE [J].

HART, OD .

[7]

HIGGS R, 1974, J ECONOMIC HISTO JUN, P468

[8]

ISHIKAWA H, 1975, AGRICULTURE DEVELOPM

[9] RESOURCE ALLOCATION UNDER SHARE CONTRACTS [J].

Johnson, D. Gale .

[10] OPTIMALITY OF A COMPETITIVE STOCK MARKET [J].

MERTON, RC ;

SUBRAHMANYAM, MG .

BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1974, 5 (01) :145-170