THE APPARENT IDEOLOGICAL BEHAVIOR OF LEGISLATORS - TESTING FOR PRINCIPAL-AGENT SLACK IN POLITICAL-INSTITUTIONS

被引:175
作者
KALT, JP [1 ]
ZUPAN, MA [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV SO CALIF,SCH BUSINESS,DEPT BUSINESS ECON,LOS ANGELES,CA 90089
关键词
D O I
10.1086/467201
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
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页码:103 / 131
页数:29
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