STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM IN OLIGOPOLY - AN EXPLANATION-BASED ON MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES

被引：74

作者：

BASU, K

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-7601, Uris Hall

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1995年 / 49卷 / 04期

关键词：

OLIGOPOLY; MANAGERIAL INCENTIVE; STACKELBERG SOLUTION; PRINCIPAL-AGENT;

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(95)00703-I

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper shows that in a model of managerial delegation in a duopoly, if an owner's decision to hire a manager is modeled explicitly, then the subgame perfect equilibrium may coincide with the Stackelberg solution. Interestingly, this can happen even when the cost of hiring a manager is the same for the owner of each firm.

引用

页码：459 / 464

页数：6