CRISIS BARGAINING, ESCALATION, AND MAD

被引：89

作者：

POWELL, R ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV MICHIGAN,ANN ARBOR,MI 48109

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1962673

中图分类号：

D0 [政治学、政治理论];

学科分类号：

0302 ; 030201 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：717 / 735

页数：19

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POWELL, R .