TIME AND PUNISHMENT - AN INTERTEMPORAL MODEL OF CRIME

[1] Allingham Michael G., 1972, J PUBLIC ECON, V1, P323, DOI [10.1016/0047-2727(72)90010-2, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(72)90010-2]

[2] CRIME AND PUNISHMENT - ECONOMIC APPROACH [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1968, 76 (02) : 169 - 217

[3] THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1981, 89 (03) : 429 - 445

[4] BLOCK MK, 1975, AM ECON REV, V65, P314

[5] PARTICIPATION IN ILLEGITIMATE ACTIVITIES - THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1973, 81 (03) : 521 - 565

[6] EHRLICH I, 1970, THESIS U CHICAGO

[7] Heineke JM., 1978, EC MODELS CRIMINAL B

[8] Kamien M.I., 1981, DYNAMIC OPTIMIZATION

[9] Kolm SC., 1973, J PUBLIC ECON, V2, P265, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(73)90018-2

[10] SJOQUIST DL, 1973, AM ECON REV, V63, P439

[1] Allingham Michael G., 1972, J PUBLIC ECON, V1, P323, DOI [10.1016/0047-2727(72)90010-2, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(72)90010-2]

[2] CRIME AND PUNISHMENT - ECONOMIC APPROACH [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1968, 76 (02) : 169 - 217

[3] THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1981, 89 (03) : 429 - 445

[4] BLOCK MK, 1975, AM ECON REV, V65, P314

[5] PARTICIPATION IN ILLEGITIMATE ACTIVITIES - THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1973, 81 (03) : 521 - 565

[6] EHRLICH I, 1970, THESIS U CHICAGO

[7] Heineke JM., 1978, EC MODELS CRIMINAL B

[8] Kamien M.I., 1981, DYNAMIC OPTIMIZATION

[9] Kolm SC., 1973, J PUBLIC ECON, V2, P265, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(73)90018-2

[10] SJOQUIST DL, 1973, AM ECON REV, V63, P439