SPONTANEOUS ORDER

被引:315
作者
SUGDEN, R
机构
关键词
D O I
10.1257/jep.3.4.85
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In a fishing village on the Yorkshire coast, there used to be an unwritten rule about the gathering of driftwood after a storm. Whoever was first onto a stretch of the shore after high tide was allowed to take whatever he wished without interference from later arrivals and to gather it into piles above the high-tide line. Provided he placed two stones on the top of each pile, the wood was regarded as his property for him to carry away when he chose. If, however, a pile had not been removed after two more high tides, this ownership right lapsed. My concern is to try to explain how rules regulating human action can evolve without conscious human design and can maintain themselves without there being any formal machinery for enforcing them. I want to be able to say something about the kinds of rules that are likely to evolve and survive. And I want to find how these rules link with rationality and with morality.
引用
收藏
页码:85 / 97
页数:13
相关论文
共 20 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], SOCIAL JUSTICE LIBER
[2]   CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM AS AN EXPRESSION OF BAYESIAN RATIONALITY [J].
AUMANN, RJ .
ECONOMETRICA, 1987, 55 (01) :1-18
[3]   THE EMERGENCE OF COOPERATION AMONG EGOISTS [J].
AXELROD, R .
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1981, 75 (02) :306-318
[4]  
Axelrod R., 1984, EVOLUTION COOPERATIO
[5]   MODELING RATIONAL PLAYERS .1. [J].
BINMORE, K .
ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY, 1987, 3 (02) :179-214
[6]  
HARSANYI JC, 1988, GENERAL THEORY EQUIL
[7]  
Hayek F. A., 1976, LAW LEGISLATION LIBE, V2
[8]  
Hayek FA, 1979, LAW LEGISLATION LIBE, DOI [10.7208/chicago/9780226321264.001.0001, DOI 10.7208/CHICAGO/9780226321264.001.0001]
[9]  
Hayek Friedrich A, 1973, RULES ORDER, V1
[10]  
Hayek Friedrich A., 2011, CONSTITUTION LIBERTY