A CRITIQUE OF VANFRAASSEN VOLUNTARISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY

被引：12

作者：

KVANVIG, JL

机构：

[1] Department of Philosophy, Texas A and M University, College Station, 77843-4237, TX

来源：

SYNTHESE | 1994年 / 98卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF01063946

中图分类号：

N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;

摘要：

Van Fraassen's epistemology is forged from two commitments, one to a type of Bayesianism and the other to what he terms voluntarism. Van Fraassen holds that if one is going to follow a rule in belief-revision, it must be a Bayesian rule, but that one does not need to follow a rule in order to be rational. It is argued that van Fraassen's arguments for rejecting non-Bayesian rules is unsound, and that his voluntarism is subject to a fatal dilemma arising from the non-monotonic character of reasoning.

引用

页码：325 / 348

页数：24