REPEATED GAMES WITH STATIONARY BOUNDED RECALL STRATEGIES

被引:46
作者
LEHRER, E
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D O I
10.1016/0022-0531(88)90153-6
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
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页码:130 / 144
页数:15
相关论文
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