NOWHERE DENSENESS OF SOCIETIES HAVING AN EQUILIBRIUM UNDER MAJORITY-RULE

[1] Arrow Kenneth J, 1951, SOCIAL CHOICE INDIVI

[2] EXPOSITORY DEVELOPMENT OF A MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF ELECTORAL PROCESS [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1970, 64 (02) : 426 - 448

[3] STABILITY IN VOTING [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1961, 29 (01) : 33 - 43

[4] Hildenbrand W., 1974, CORE EQUILIBRIA LARG

[5] CONTINUITY PROPERTIES OF CORE OF A MARKET [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1970, 38 (06) : 791 - &

[6] CLASS OF EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS FOR MAJORITY-RULE [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1973, 41 (02) : 285 - 297

[7] Nakamura K., 1975, International Journal of Game Theory, V4, P95, DOI 10.1007/BF01766188

[8] Plott CR, 1967, AM ECON REV, V57, P787

[9] SCHOFIELD N, 1976, GENERIC INSTABILITY

[10] [No title captured]

[1] Arrow Kenneth J, 1951, SOCIAL CHOICE INDIVI

[2] EXPOSITORY DEVELOPMENT OF A MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF ELECTORAL PROCESS [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1970, 64 (02) : 426 - 448

[3] STABILITY IN VOTING [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1961, 29 (01) : 33 - 43

[4] Hildenbrand W., 1974, CORE EQUILIBRIA LARG

[5] CONTINUITY PROPERTIES OF CORE OF A MARKET [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1970, 38 (06) : 791 - &

[6] CLASS OF EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS FOR MAJORITY-RULE [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1973, 41 (02) : 285 - 297

[7] Nakamura K., 1975, International Journal of Game Theory, V4, P95, DOI 10.1007/BF01766188

[8] Plott CR, 1967, AM ECON REV, V57, P787

[9] SCHOFIELD N, 1976, GENERIC INSTABILITY

[10] [No title captured]