Optimal Incentive Contracts for Loss-Averse Managers: Stock Options versus Restricted Stock Grants

被引：13

作者：

Dodonova, Anna ^{[1
]}

Khoroshilov, Yuri ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, Canada

来源：

FINANCIAL REVIEW | 2006年 / 41卷 / 04期

关键词：

executive stock options; incentive compensation; incentive contract; managerial risk aversion; restricted stock; behavioral finance;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1540-6288.2006.00153.x

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This paper provides an explanation for the widespread use of stock option grants in executive compensation. It shows that the optimal incentive contract for loss-averse managers must contain a substantial portion of stock options even when it should consist exclusively of stock grants for "classical" risk-averse managers. The paper also provides an explanation for the drastic increase in the risk-adjusted level of CEO compensations over the past two decades and argues that more option-based compensation should be used in firms with higher cash flow volatility and in industries with a higher degree of heterogeneity among firms.

引用

页码：451 / 482

页数：32

共 32 条

[1]

ABEL AB, 1990, AM ECON REV, V80, P38

[2] CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate voluntary disclosures [J].