THE INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY SET AND CORPORATE FINANCING, DIVIDEND, AND COMPENSATION POLICIES

被引：1487

作者：

SMITH, CW

WATTS, RL

机构：

[1] University of Rochester, Rochester

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 1992年 / 32卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0304-405X(92)90029-W

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We examine explanations for corporate financing-, dividend-, and compensation-policy choices. We document robust empirical relations among corporate policy decisions and various firm characteristics. Our evidence suggests contracting theories are more important in explaining cross-sectional variation in observed financial, dividend, and compensation policies than either tax-based or signaling theories.

引用

页码：263 / 292

页数：30

共 38 条

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