CONSISTENT MAJORITY RULES OVER COMPACT SETS OF ALTERNATIVES

被引：114

作者：

GREENBERG, J

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1910410

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：627 / 636

页数：10

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