EXTERNALITIES, WELFARE, AND THE THEORY OF GAMES

[1] ARROW KJ, 1951, 2ND BERK S MATH STAT, P528

[2] Baumol W.J., 1952, WELFARE EC THEORY ST

[3] CHARNES A, 1954, NAVAL RES LOGISTICS, V2

[4] DAVIS, 1961, LAW CONT PROBLEMS, V26

[5] DAVIS OA, 1959, THESIS U VIRGINIA

[6] DAVIS OA, EC COMPLEX SYSTEMS C

[7] A FURTHER GENERALIZATION OF THE KAKUTANI FIXED POINT THEOREM, WITH APPLICATION TO NASH EQUILIBRIUM POINTS [J]. PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL SOCIETY, 1952, 3 (01) : 170 - 174

[8] GRAAFF JD, 1957, THEORETICAL WELFARE, P19

[9] ASSIGNMENT PROBLEMS AND THE LOCATION OF ECONOMIC-ACTIVITIES [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1957, 25 (01) : 53 - 76

[10] EXTERNAL ECONOMIES AND DISECONOMIES IN A COMPETITIVE SITUATION [J]. ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1952, 62 (245) : 54 - 67

[1] ARROW KJ, 1951, 2ND BERK S MATH STAT, P528

[2] Baumol W.J., 1952, WELFARE EC THEORY ST

[3] CHARNES A, 1954, NAVAL RES LOGISTICS, V2

[4] DAVIS, 1961, LAW CONT PROBLEMS, V26

[5] DAVIS OA, 1959, THESIS U VIRGINIA

[6] DAVIS OA, EC COMPLEX SYSTEMS C

[7] A FURTHER GENERALIZATION OF THE KAKUTANI FIXED POINT THEOREM, WITH APPLICATION TO NASH EQUILIBRIUM POINTS [J]. PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL SOCIETY, 1952, 3 (01) : 170 - 174

[8] GRAAFF JD, 1957, THEORETICAL WELFARE, P19

[9] ASSIGNMENT PROBLEMS AND THE LOCATION OF ECONOMIC-ACTIVITIES [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1957, 25 (01) : 53 - 76

[10] EXTERNAL ECONOMIES AND DISECONOMIES IN A COMPETITIVE SITUATION [J]. ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1952, 62 (245) : 54 - 67