In compliance decisions, the decision maker usually has only vague or ambiguous knowledge of the probability of being caught and the outcome (amount of penalty). An experiment is reported which extends work on effects of probability ambiguity by manipulating outcome ambiguity as well. When outcomes were limited to a bounded range and probabilities ranged between their natural boundaries [0, 1] in experimental tax decisions, symmetrical boundary effects were found in which vague estimates for both the probability and outcome dimensions caused vagueness aversion (and higher compliance) when the vague estimate was near the more favorable lower boundary of either dimension and vagueness seeking (and lower compliance) when the vague estimate was near the less favorable upper boundary. Probability and outcome vagueness effects were found to be independent of the vagueness of the other dimension, and vagueness effects were not systematically related to the level of the other dimension. The results suggest that a common cognitive process mediates the impact of vagueness on both dimensions. This may be a vagueness-adjustment process in which vague estimates are adjusted toward the middle of the bounded range, or a vagueness-preference process in which vague outcomes, and vague probabilities as well, are evaluated based on utility considerations, as though probability were a tangible commodity. For increasing compliance, the results suggest that risk information should be disseminated only when risks of punishment are relatively high. When risks are low, random enforcement techniques that enhance vagueness become more effective. © 1991.