SERVICE-INDUCED CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND THE ELECTORAL EQUILIBRIUM

[1] MACROECONOMIC POLICY IN A 2-PARTY SYSTEM AS A REPEATED GAME [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1987, 102 (03) : 651 - 678

[2] ALESINA A, IN PRESS AM EC REV

[3] ARANSON PH, 1979, PUBLIC CHOICE, V34, P435

[4] ELECTIONS, COALITIONS, AND LEGISLATIVE OUTCOMES [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1988, 82 (02) : 405 - 422

[5] BARON DP, 1986, 834 STANF U WORK PAP

[6] CANDIDATE REPUTATIONS AND THE INCUMBENCY EFFECT [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1985, 27 (01) : 47 - 67

[7] Downs A., 1957, EC THEORY DEMOCRACY

[8] Fenno R., 1978, HOME STYLE

[9] FEREJOHN JA, 1985, P851 STANF U HOOV I

[10] VOTERS, BUREAUCRATS AND LEGISLATORS - RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVE ON GROWTH OF BUREAUCRACY [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1978, 9 (02) : 239 - 254

[1] MACROECONOMIC POLICY IN A 2-PARTY SYSTEM AS A REPEATED GAME [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1987, 102 (03) : 651 - 678

[2] ALESINA A, IN PRESS AM EC REV

[3] ARANSON PH, 1979, PUBLIC CHOICE, V34, P435

[4] ELECTIONS, COALITIONS, AND LEGISLATIVE OUTCOMES [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1988, 82 (02) : 405 - 422

[5] BARON DP, 1986, 834 STANF U WORK PAP

[6] CANDIDATE REPUTATIONS AND THE INCUMBENCY EFFECT [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1985, 27 (01) : 47 - 67

[7] Downs A., 1957, EC THEORY DEMOCRACY

[8] Fenno R., 1978, HOME STYLE

[9] FEREJOHN JA, 1985, P851 STANF U HOOV I

[10] VOTERS, BUREAUCRATS AND LEGISLATORS - RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVE ON GROWTH OF BUREAUCRACY [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1978, 9 (02) : 239 - 254