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PAYING TO IMPROVE YOUR CHANCES - GAMBLING OR INSURANCE
被引:30
作者
:
MCGUIRE, M
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
HARVARD UNIV,SCH BUSINESS,BOSTON,MA 02163
MCGUIRE, M
PRATT, J
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
HARVARD UNIV,SCH BUSINESS,BOSTON,MA 02163
PRATT, J
ZECKHAUSER, R
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
HARVARD UNIV,SCH BUSINESS,BOSTON,MA 02163
ZECKHAUSER, R
机构
:
[1]
HARVARD UNIV,SCH BUSINESS,BOSTON,MA 02163
[2]
HARVARD UNIV,JOHN F KENNEDY SCH GOVT,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138
来源
:
JOURNAL OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY
|
1991年
/ 4卷
/ 04期
关键词
:
GAMBLING;
INSURANCE;
RISK;
RISK AVERSION;
PROBABILITY SHIFTING;
UTILITY THEORY;
D O I
:
10.1007/BF00056159
中图分类号
:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
:
0202 ;
摘要
:
Will a more risk-averse individual spend more or less to improve probabilities, say on marketing efforts that enhance the chance of a sale? For any two payoffs and starting probabilities, the answer is unfortunately indeterminate. However, interpreting gambling as increasing small chances of good outcomes and insurance as reducing small chances of bad outcomes, the more risk-averse individual will pay less (more) to gamble (insure). We find a critical switching probability that depends on the individuals and outcomes involved. If the good outcome is less (more) likely than this critical value, the expenditures represent gambling (insurance). © 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
引用
收藏
页码:329 / 338
页数:10
相关论文
共 7 条
[1]
ARROW KJ, 1963, AM ECON REV, V53, P941
[2]
SELF-INSURANCE, SELF-PROTECTION AND INCREASED RISK-AVERSION
DIONNE, G
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
UNIV LILLE 1,F-59655 VILLENEUVE DASCQ,FRANCE
DIONNE, G
EECKHOUDT, L
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
UNIV LILLE 1,F-59655 VILLENEUVE DASCQ,FRANCE
EECKHOUDT, L
[J].
ECONOMICS LETTERS,
1985,
17
(1-2)
: 39
-
42
[3]
MARKET INSURANCE, SELF-INSURANCE, AND SELF-PROTECTION
EHRLICH, I
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
TEL AVIV UNIV,TEL AVIV,ISRAEL
EHRLICH, I
BECKER, GS
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
TEL AVIV UNIV,TEL AVIV,ISRAEL
BECKER, GS
[J].
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY,
1972,
80
(04)
: 623
-
648
[4]
HIRSHLEIFER J, 1979, J ECON LIT, V17, P1375
[5]
MCGUIRE MC, 1988, PROTECTION DOMESTIC
[6]
MCGUIRE MC, 1988, UNPUB ALLIANCE PROTE
[7]
OVERINSURANCE AND PUBLIC PROVISION OF INSURANCE - ROLES OF MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION
PAULY, MV
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
NORTHWESTERN UNIV,EVANSTON,IL 60201
NORTHWESTERN UNIV,EVANSTON,IL 60201
PAULY, MV
[J].
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS,
1974,
88
(01)
: 44
-
62
←
1
→
共 7 条
[1]
ARROW KJ, 1963, AM ECON REV, V53, P941
[2]
SELF-INSURANCE, SELF-PROTECTION AND INCREASED RISK-AVERSION
DIONNE, G
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
UNIV LILLE 1,F-59655 VILLENEUVE DASCQ,FRANCE
DIONNE, G
EECKHOUDT, L
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
UNIV LILLE 1,F-59655 VILLENEUVE DASCQ,FRANCE
EECKHOUDT, L
[J].
ECONOMICS LETTERS,
1985,
17
(1-2)
: 39
-
42
[3]
MARKET INSURANCE, SELF-INSURANCE, AND SELF-PROTECTION
EHRLICH, I
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
TEL AVIV UNIV,TEL AVIV,ISRAEL
EHRLICH, I
BECKER, GS
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
TEL AVIV UNIV,TEL AVIV,ISRAEL
BECKER, GS
[J].
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY,
1972,
80
(04)
: 623
-
648
[4]
HIRSHLEIFER J, 1979, J ECON LIT, V17, P1375
[5]
MCGUIRE MC, 1988, PROTECTION DOMESTIC
[6]
MCGUIRE MC, 1988, UNPUB ALLIANCE PROTE
[7]
OVERINSURANCE AND PUBLIC PROVISION OF INSURANCE - ROLES OF MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION
PAULY, MV
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
NORTHWESTERN UNIV,EVANSTON,IL 60201
NORTHWESTERN UNIV,EVANSTON,IL 60201
PAULY, MV
[J].
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS,
1974,
88
(01)
: 44
-
62
←
1
→