MORE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION

[1] THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION [J]. SCIENCE, 1981, 211 (4489) : 1390 - 1396

[2] NO PURE STRATEGY IS EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE IN THE REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAME [J]. NATURE, 1987, 327 (6117) : 58 - 59

[3] MUTUAL RESTRAINT IN TREE SWALLOWS - A TEST OF THE TIT FOR TAT MODEL OF RECIPROCITY [J]. SCIENCE, 1985, 227 (4692) : 1363 - 1365

[4] THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION [J]. NATURE, 1981, 292 (5821) : 291 - 292

[5] TIT-FOR-TAT IN STICKLEBACKS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION [J]. NATURE, 1987, 325 (6103) : 433 - 435

[6] WHATEVER HAPPENED TO RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM [J]. TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION, 1986, 1 (06) : 142 - 142

[7] Pitcher T.J., 1986, P294

[8] DICING WITH DEATH - PREDATOR INSPECTION BEHAVIOR IN MINNOW SHOALS [J]. JOURNAL OF FISH BIOLOGY, 1986, 28 (04) : 439 - 448

[9] THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA AND DYNAMICAL-SYSTEMS ASSOCIATED TO NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1980, 48 (07) : 1617 - 1634

[1] THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION [J]. SCIENCE, 1981, 211 (4489) : 1390 - 1396

[2] NO PURE STRATEGY IS EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE IN THE REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAME [J]. NATURE, 1987, 327 (6117) : 58 - 59

[3] MUTUAL RESTRAINT IN TREE SWALLOWS - A TEST OF THE TIT FOR TAT MODEL OF RECIPROCITY [J]. SCIENCE, 1985, 227 (4692) : 1363 - 1365

[4] THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION [J]. NATURE, 1981, 292 (5821) : 291 - 292

[5] TIT-FOR-TAT IN STICKLEBACKS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION [J]. NATURE, 1987, 325 (6103) : 433 - 435

[6] WHATEVER HAPPENED TO RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM [J]. TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION, 1986, 1 (06) : 142 - 142

[7] Pitcher T.J., 1986, P294

[8] DICING WITH DEATH - PREDATOR INSPECTION BEHAVIOR IN MINNOW SHOALS [J]. JOURNAL OF FISH BIOLOGY, 1986, 28 (04) : 439 - 448

[9] THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA AND DYNAMICAL-SYSTEMS ASSOCIATED TO NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1980, 48 (07) : 1617 - 1634