THE ROLE OF UNCERTAINTY IN RESOURCE DILEMMAS

Resource dilemmas entail a conflict between self-interests and the welfare of a group or society at large. If a majority of individuals fail to restrain themselves, scarce common resources such as water, air, and forests will be depleted or polluted. Previous research has shown that individuals with a pro-social value orientation act in the interest of the collective (cooperate) rather than in self-interest (defect). However, many people only do that if the situation imposes constraints on their egoistic or individualistic value orientation. Such factors include group identification, communication with and social pressure exerted by group members, and rewards and penalties. Incomplete knowledge about how others act (social uncertainty) and about the degree of depletion/pollution of a resource (environmental uncertainty) are still other factors which affect cooperation. Based on an analysis of the role of these factors drawing on theories of how decisions are made under risk and uncertainty, we suggest that individuals with a pro-social value orientation, to whom collective consequences are most salient, may cooperate even though the beneficial consequences are uncertain. For egoistic persons, the sure individual gain of defecting dominates other consequences which are uncertain. If people are also risk-seeking, increased uncertainty may increase defection. Even though egoism is constrained, how the individual is affected by collective consequences is still salient. As such consequences are perceived to be uncertain, increasing uncertainty will make cooperation less consistent. (C) 1995 Academic Press Limited