PROBLEMS WITH THE CAUSE-REASON DISTINCTION IN ATTRIBUTION THEORY

A. R. Buss's (see record 1980-09652-001) statement on causal and reason explanations of behavior involves a contribution regarding a necessary distinction in attribution theory. In the present paper, it is argued that despite his reformulation of previous analyses of lay attribution, Buss fails to provide substantive guidance for empirically testing the major assumptions of his hypothesized cause-reason distinction. Most important, Buss's analysis does not yield unambiguous theoretical criteria for operationally distinguishing intentional actions and unintentional occurrences and for judging the content of actors' and observers' explanations as causal or reason in nature. Without such specifications, it is concluded that Buss's central ideas may be empirically untestable. (14 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved). © 1979 American Psychological Association.