ON THE OPTIMALITY OF INCENTIVE CONTRACTS IN THE PRESENCE OF JOINT COSTS

被引：5

作者：

COHEN, SI ^{[1
]}

LOEB, MP ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV MARYLAND,COLLEGE PK,MD 20742

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 1990年 / 8卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0167-7187(90)90005-L

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Firms that supply goods to the government often produce these goods in conjunction with other goods, incurring joint or common production costs. When the government uses costs as a basis for contracting with such firms, questions of cost allocation naturally arise. This paper presents, in the context of a bidding model, conditions under which a fixed-price contract is optimal (in the class of linear contracts) for the government. Under these conditions the problem of cost allocation is totally avoidable. © 1990.

引用

页码：405 / 416

页数：12