HOSTILE BANK TAKEOVER OFFERS - ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS

被引:11
作者
BARADWAJ, BG
FRASER, DR
FURTADO, EPH
机构
[1] Texas A and M University, College Station
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0378-4266(90)90011-P
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
A comparison of the financial characteristics of banks involved in hostile takeover bids with a control group of nonhostile bank mergers indicates: (1) hostile targets experience abnormal returns that are significantly greater than for the targets of nonhostile bank mergers; (2) hostile bidders experience negative abnormal returns that are insignificantly different than for bidders involved in nonhostile bank mergers; (3) hostile bank acquisition announcements produce positive net wealth effects which are larger than the wealth effects of nonhostile acquisitions; (4) a Logit regression model using financial ratios, stock price data, and ownership data is able to distinguish between hostile and nonhostile targets. © 1990.
引用
收藏
页码:1229 / 1242
页数:14
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