INDUSTRIAL-STRUCTURE AND MONOPOLY POWER IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY - AN EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS

被引:6
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CARROLL, KA
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10.1111/j.1465-7295.1989.tb00796.x
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F [经济];
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02 ;
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页码:683 / 703
页数:21
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