GROUP INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE MECHANISM YIELDING CORE ALLOCATIONS

被引：35

作者：

KALAI, E ^{[1
]}

POSTLEWAITE, A ^{[1
]}

ROBERTS, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV ILLINOIS,DEPT ECON,URBANA,IL 61801

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1979年 / 20卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(79)90060-7

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：13 / 22

页数：10

共 21 条

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[10] BARRIERS TO TRADE AND DISADVANTAGEOUS MIDDLEMEN - NON-MONOTONICITY OF THE CORE [J].

KALAI, E ;

POSTLEWAITE, A ;

ROBERTS, J .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1978, 19 (01) :200-209

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