OPTIMAL INCENTIVE SCHEMES - EXISTENCE AND CHARACTERIZATION

被引:4
作者
CLARKE, FH [1 ]
DARROUGH, MN [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV SANTA CLARA,SANTA CLARA,CA 95053
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0165-1765(80)90122-6
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:305 / 310
页数:6
相关论文
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