SOFTWARE PIRACY - AN ANALYSIS OF PROTECTION STRATEGIES

被引:333
作者
CONNER, KR [1 ]
RUMELT, RP [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV CALIF LOS ANGELES,ANDERSON GRAD SCH MANAGEMENT,LOS ANGELES,CA 90024
关键词
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.37.2.125
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Software piracy by users is generally believed to harm both software firms (through lower profits) and buying customers (through higher prices). Thus, it is thought that perfect and costless technological protection would benefit both firms and consumers. The model developed here suggests that in some circumstances, even with significant piracy, not protecting can be the best policy, both raising firm profits and lowering selling prices. Key to the analysis is joining the presence of a positive network externality with the fact that piracy increases the total number of program users. The network externality exists because consumers have an incentive to economize on post-purchase learning and customization costs.
引用
收藏
页码:125 / 139
页数:15
相关论文
共 13 条
[1]  
ARTHUR B, 1985, COMPETING TECHNOLOGI
[2]  
Besen S.M., 1986, INF ECON POLICY, V2, P5
[3]  
DAVID PA, 1985, AM ECON REV, V75, P332
[4]   STANDARDIZATION, COMPATIBILITY, AND INNOVATION [J].
FARRELL, J ;
SALONER, G .
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1985, 16 (01) :70-83
[5]  
FARRELL J, 1986, AM ECON REV, V76, P940
[6]   THE ECONOMICS OF COPYING [J].
JOHNSON, WR .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1985, 93 (01) :158-174
[7]   TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION IN THE PRESENCE OF NETWORK EXTERNALITIES [J].
KATZ, ML ;
SHAPIRO, C .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1986, 94 (04) :822-841
[8]  
KATZ ML, 1985, AM ECON REV, V75, P424
[9]  
LEIBENSTEIN H, 1950, Q J ECON, V58, P183
[10]   COPYING AND INDIRECT APPROPRIABILITY - PHOTOCOPYING OF JOURNALS [J].
LIEBOWITZ, SJ .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1985, 93 (05) :945-957