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OPTIMAL PAYMENT SYSTEMS FOR HEALTH-SERVICES
被引:160
作者
:
ELLIS, RP
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
Department of Economics, Boston University, Boston
ELLIS, RP
MCGUIRE, TG
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
Department of Economics, Boston University, Boston
MCGUIRE, TG
机构
:
[1]
Department of Economics, Boston University, Boston
来源
:
JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS
|
1990年
/ 9卷
/ 04期
关键词
:
D O I
:
10.1016/0167-6296(90)90001-J
中图分类号
:
F [经济];
学科分类号
:
02 ;
摘要
:
Demand-side cost sharing and the supply-side reimbursement system provide two separate instruments that can be used to influence the quantity of health services consumed. For risk-averse consumers, optimal payment systems - pairs of insurance and reimbursement plans - are characterized by conflict rather than consensus between patient and provider about the quantity of treatment. A model of conflict resolution based on bargaining theory is used to represent the outcome when the payment system creates divergences between desired demand and desired supply. Using that model, we describe the optimal combination of insurance and reimbursement systems that maximize consumer welfare. © 1991.
引用
收藏
页码:375 / 396
页数:22
相关论文
共 19 条
[1]
ARROW KJ, 1963, AM ECON REV, V53, P941
[2]
OPTIMAL REIMBURSEMENT HEALTH-INSURANCE AND THE THEORY OF RAMSEY TAXATION
BESLEY, TJ
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
BESLEY, TJ
[J].
JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS,
1988,
7
(04)
: 321
-
336
[3]
THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION IN ECONOMIC MODELING
BINMORE, K
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
HEBREW UNIV JERUSALEM,JERUSALEM,ISRAEL
HEBREW UNIV JERUSALEM,JERUSALEM,ISRAEL
BINMORE, K
RUBINSTEIN, A
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
HEBREW UNIV JERUSALEM,JERUSALEM,ISRAEL
HEBREW UNIV JERUSALEM,JERUSALEM,ISRAEL
RUBINSTEIN, A
WOLINSKY, A
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
HEBREW UNIV JERUSALEM,JERUSALEM,ISRAEL
HEBREW UNIV JERUSALEM,JERUSALEM,ISRAEL
WOLINSKY, A
[J].
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS,
1986,
17
(02)
: 176
-
188
[4]
BINMORE KG, 1980, NASH BARGAINING TH 2
[5]
RATE-SETTING BY DIAGNOSIS RELATED GROUPS AND HOSPITAL SPECIALIZATION
DRANOVE, D
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
DRANOVE, D
[J].
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS,
1987,
18
(03)
: 417
-
427
[6]
PROVIDER BEHAVIOR UNDER PROSPECTIVE REIMBURSEMENT - COST-SHARING AND SUPPLY
ELLIS, RP
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
ELLIS, RP
MCGUIRE, TG
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
MCGUIRE, TG
[J].
JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS,
1986,
5
(02)
: 129
-
151
[7]
INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND THE DESIGN OF PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEMS
ELLIS, RP
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
ELLIS, RP
MCGUIRE, TG
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
MCGUIRE, TG
[J].
JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS,
1988,
7
(03)
: 215
-
237
[8]
Evans R., 1974, EC HLTH MED CARE
[9]
THE EFFECT OF BENEFIT DESIGN ON THE LENGTH OF STAY OF MEDICAID PSYCHIATRIC-PATIENTS
FRANK, RG
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
UNIV PITTSBURGH,HLTH ECON,PITTSBURGH,PA 15260
UNIV PITTSBURGH,HLTH ECON,PITTSBURGH,PA 15260
FRANK, RG
LAVE, JR
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
UNIV PITTSBURGH,HLTH ECON,PITTSBURGH,PA 15260
UNIV PITTSBURGH,HLTH ECON,PITTSBURGH,PA 15260
LAVE, JR
[J].
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RESOURCES,
1986,
21
(03)
: 321
-
337
[10]
A COMPARISON OF HOSPITAL RESPONSES TO REIMBURSEMENT POLICIES FOR MEDICAID PSYCHIATRIC-PATIENTS
FRANK, RG
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
UNIV PITTSBURGH,PITTSBURGH,PA 15260
UNIV PITTSBURGH,PITTSBURGH,PA 15260
FRANK, RG
LAVE, JR
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
UNIV PITTSBURGH,PITTSBURGH,PA 15260
UNIV PITTSBURGH,PITTSBURGH,PA 15260
LAVE, JR
[J].
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS,
1989,
20
(04)
: 588
-
600
←
1
2
→
共 19 条
[1]
ARROW KJ, 1963, AM ECON REV, V53, P941
[2]
OPTIMAL REIMBURSEMENT HEALTH-INSURANCE AND THE THEORY OF RAMSEY TAXATION
BESLEY, TJ
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
BESLEY, TJ
[J].
JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS,
1988,
7
(04)
: 321
-
336
[3]
THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION IN ECONOMIC MODELING
BINMORE, K
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
HEBREW UNIV JERUSALEM,JERUSALEM,ISRAEL
HEBREW UNIV JERUSALEM,JERUSALEM,ISRAEL
BINMORE, K
RUBINSTEIN, A
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
HEBREW UNIV JERUSALEM,JERUSALEM,ISRAEL
HEBREW UNIV JERUSALEM,JERUSALEM,ISRAEL
RUBINSTEIN, A
WOLINSKY, A
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
HEBREW UNIV JERUSALEM,JERUSALEM,ISRAEL
HEBREW UNIV JERUSALEM,JERUSALEM,ISRAEL
WOLINSKY, A
[J].
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS,
1986,
17
(02)
: 176
-
188
[4]
BINMORE KG, 1980, NASH BARGAINING TH 2
[5]
RATE-SETTING BY DIAGNOSIS RELATED GROUPS AND HOSPITAL SPECIALIZATION
DRANOVE, D
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
DRANOVE, D
[J].
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS,
1987,
18
(03)
: 417
-
427
[6]
PROVIDER BEHAVIOR UNDER PROSPECTIVE REIMBURSEMENT - COST-SHARING AND SUPPLY
ELLIS, RP
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
ELLIS, RP
MCGUIRE, TG
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
MCGUIRE, TG
[J].
JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS,
1986,
5
(02)
: 129
-
151
[7]
INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND THE DESIGN OF PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEMS
ELLIS, RP
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
ELLIS, RP
MCGUIRE, TG
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
MCGUIRE, TG
[J].
JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS,
1988,
7
(03)
: 215
-
237
[8]
Evans R., 1974, EC HLTH MED CARE
[9]
THE EFFECT OF BENEFIT DESIGN ON THE LENGTH OF STAY OF MEDICAID PSYCHIATRIC-PATIENTS
FRANK, RG
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
UNIV PITTSBURGH,HLTH ECON,PITTSBURGH,PA 15260
UNIV PITTSBURGH,HLTH ECON,PITTSBURGH,PA 15260
FRANK, RG
LAVE, JR
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
UNIV PITTSBURGH,HLTH ECON,PITTSBURGH,PA 15260
UNIV PITTSBURGH,HLTH ECON,PITTSBURGH,PA 15260
LAVE, JR
[J].
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RESOURCES,
1986,
21
(03)
: 321
-
337
[10]
A COMPARISON OF HOSPITAL RESPONSES TO REIMBURSEMENT POLICIES FOR MEDICAID PSYCHIATRIC-PATIENTS
FRANK, RG
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
UNIV PITTSBURGH,PITTSBURGH,PA 15260
UNIV PITTSBURGH,PITTSBURGH,PA 15260
FRANK, RG
LAVE, JR
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
UNIV PITTSBURGH,PITTSBURGH,PA 15260
UNIV PITTSBURGH,PITTSBURGH,PA 15260
LAVE, JR
[J].
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS,
1989,
20
(04)
: 588
-
600
←
1
2
→