A MARKET TEST FOR NATURAL MONOPOLY IN LOCAL EXCHANGE

被引:5
作者
BERG, SV [1 ]
TSCHIRHART, J [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV WYOMING,DEPT ECON & FINANCE,LARAMIE,WY 82071
关键词
D O I
10.1007/BF01072585
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Is the incumbent local exchange carrier (LEG) a natural monopolist? The analysis indicates that the LEC cost function is not supportable: LECs appear to be either nonsustainable natural monopolies or non natural monopolies over the set of services they currently offer. However, recent technological changes suggest that whether LECs are natural monopolies over their current offerings is immaterial for policy making, because competitors are enjoying economies of scope in offering both LEC and non LEC services. Based on these results, deregulation of LECs is discussed in a Type I/Type II error framework.
引用
收藏
页码:103 / 124
页数:22
相关论文
共 54 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], 1982, THEORY NATURAL MONOP
[2]  
BAIN JS, 1992, FIBER BYPASS EMERGIN
[3]  
Baumol W., 1982, CONTESTABLE MARKETS
[4]  
Baumol W. J., 1994, COMPETITION LOCAL TE
[5]  
BERG SANFORD V., 1988, NATURAL MONOPOLY REG
[6]  
BESANKO D, 1986, FUNDAMENTAL PURE APP, V20
[7]  
Bonbright J. C., 1988, PRINCIPLES PUBLIC UT
[8]  
Braeutigam R. R., 1989, HDB IND ORG, V2
[9]   DIVERSIFICATION INCENTIVES UNDER PRICE-BASED AND COST-BASED REGULATION [J].
BRAEUTIGAM, RR ;
PANZAR, JC .
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1989, 20 (03) :373-391
[10]   CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION AND COST MISALLOCATION BY REGULATED MONOPOLISTS [J].
BRENNAN, TJ .
JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS, 1990, 2 (01) :37-51