EXISTENCE AND DYNAMIC CONSISTENCY OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM WITH NONEXPECTED UTILITY PREFERENCES

被引：37

作者：

DEKEL, E

SAFRA, Z

SEGAL, U

机构：

[1] UNIV PENN,PHILADELPHIA,PA 19104

[2] TEL AVIV UNIV,IL-69978 TEL AVIV,ISRAEL

[3] UNIV TORONTO,TORONTO M5S 1A1,ONTARIO,CANADA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1991年 / 55卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(91)90039-7

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium are given when preferences may violate the reduction of compound lotteries assumption (RCLA). Without RCLA decision makers may not be indifferent between compound lotteries which have the same probabilities of final outcomes. Therefore the conditions depend on how players perceive the game-whether they view themselves as moving first or second. We also review conditions under which the equilibria will be dynamically consistent. © 1991.

引用

页码：229 / 246

页数：18

共 31 条

[1] CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM AS AN EXPRESSION OF BAYESIAN RATIONALITY [J].