TRANSACTION COSTS AND THE DESIGN OF CROPSHARE CONTRACTS

被引：73

作者：

ALLEN, DW ^{[1
]}

LUECK, D ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] LOUISIANA STATE UNIV,BATON ROUGE,LA 70803

来源：

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1993年 / 24卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2555954

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Modern cropshare contracts are explained using a model in which agents are risk neutral and contract rules are chosen to maximize expected joint wealth. It is shown that the farmer either bears the entire cost of inputs or shares the costs with the landowner in the same proportion as the output. The incentives of altering the cropshare percentage are examined and are used to derive implications about the portion of the crop that will be owned by the farmer. The model is tested and supported using data from a 1986 survey of farmers and landowners in Nebraska and South Dakota.

引用

页码：78 / 100

页数：23

共 44 条

[1] UNCERTAINTY, EVOLUTION, AND ECONOMIC THEORY [J].