AGING AND CREDIBILITY JUDGMENT

被引:20
作者
MUTTER, SA [1 ]
LINDSEY, SE [1 ]
PLISKE, RM [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV DAYTON,DAYTON,OH 45469
来源
AGING AND COGNITION | 1995年 / 2卷 / 02期
关键词
D O I
10.1080/13825589508256590
中图分类号
B844 [发展心理学(人类心理学)];
学科分类号
040202 ;
摘要
The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of aging on credibility judgments and source memory for statements expressing new ''factual'' knowledge. In Experiment 1, we examined the influence of familiarity in young and older adults' credibility judgments by comparing their truth ratings for repeated and nonrepeated statements of unknown credibility. In Experiment 2, we provided information on the actual truth or falsity of some of the repeated statements to determine whether this objective evidence would have less influence in older adults' later credibility judgments than in younger adults' judgments. In both experiments, we examined age-related differences in source memory for the statements. The major findings were as follows: (a) the influence of knowledge familiarity as a subjective basis for credibility judgment did not decline with age; (b) compared to young adults, older adults were just as likely to use objective evidence of statement credibility in their judgments when this evidence confirmed the truth of their knowledge, but were somewhat less likely to do so when this evidence disconfirmed the truth of their knowledge; and (c) older adults' memory for the source of their knowledge was consistently less accurate than that of young adults. These findings suggest that older adults will not be at a disadvantage relative to young adults when their credibility judgments can be based on the subjective evidence of knowledge familiarity, but they will sometimes be at a disadvantage when a more objective basis for judgment is required. In particular, age-related declines in the ability to process evidence that disconfirms the credibility of knowledge may lead to a magnification of the natural tendency to believe rather than disbelieve (cf. Gilbert, 1991).
引用
收藏
页码:89 / 107
页数:19
相关论文
共 40 条
[1]  
Arkes H.R., 1989, J BEHAVIORAL DECISIO, V2, P81, DOI DOI 10.1002/BDM.3960020203
[2]   DETERMINANTS OF JUDGED VALIDITY [J].
ARKES, HR ;
BOEHM, LE ;
XU, G .
JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 1991, 27 (06) :576-605
[3]   CREDIBILITY OF REPEATED STATEMENTS - MEMORY FOR TRIVIA [J].
BACON, FT .
JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-HUMAN LEARNING AND MEMORY, 1979, 5 (03) :241-252
[4]   ON BELIEVING WHAT WE REMEMBER [J].
BEGG, I ;
ARMOUR, V ;
KERR, T .
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCE-REVUE CANADIENNE DES SCIENCES DU COMPORTEMENT, 1985, 17 (03) :199-214
[5]   REPETITION AND THE RING OF TRUTH - BIASING COMMENTS [J].
BEGG, I .
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCE-REVUE CANADIENNE DES SCIENCES DU COMPORTEMENT, 1991, 23 (02) :195-213
[6]   DISSOCIATION OF PROCESSES IN BELIEF - SOURCE RECOLLECTION, STATEMENT FAMILIARITY, AND THE ILLUSION OF TRUTH [J].
BEGG, IM ;
ANAS, A ;
FARINACCI, S .
JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-GENERAL, 1992, 121 (04) :446-458
[7]   EFFECTS OF AGING ON SOURCE MONITORING - DIFFERENCES IN SUSCEPTIBILITY TO FALSE FAME [J].
DYWAN, J ;
JACOBY, L .
PSYCHOLOGY AND AGING, 1990, 5 (03) :379-387
[8]  
GIESELMAN R E, 1985, Memory and Cognition, V13, P57
[9]   HOW MENTAL SYSTEMS BELIEVE [J].
GILBERT, DT .
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST, 1991, 46 (02) :107-119
[10]   UNBELIEVING THE UNBELIEVABLE - SOME PROBLEMS IN THE REJECTION OF FALSE INFORMATION [J].
GILBERT, DT ;
KRULL, DS ;
MALONE, PS .
JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 1990, 59 (04) :601-613