UNIONS, TAXES AND THE STRUCTURE OF MULTINATIONAL-ENTERPRISES

被引:10
作者
HUIZINGA, H
机构
[1] Stanford University, Stanford
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0165-1765(90)90184-3
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This note analyzes how a firm's relationship with unions or tax authorities influences its basic structure. In particular, it is shown that the prospect of capture by unions or tax authorities of part of the rents associated with the firm's investments leads it to open more plants than is technologically efficient. Thus unions and taxes are an independent reason for a firm's expansion nationally and for foreign direct investment. © 1990.
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页码:73 / 75
页数:3
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