THE EVOLUTION OF ONE-SHOT COOPERATION - AN EXPERIMENT

被引：149

作者：

FRANK, RH

GILOVICH, T

REGAN, DT

机构：

[1] Cornell University, Ithaca, NY

来源：

ETHOLOGY AND SOCIOBIOLOGY | 1993年 / 14卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0162-3095(93)90020-I

中图分类号：

B84 [心理学];

学科分类号：

04 ; 0402 ;

摘要：

Can people rationally advance their own material interests by cooperating in one-shot prisoner's dilemmas, even when there is no possibility of being punished for defection? We outline a model that describes how such cooperation could evolve if the presence of a cooperative disposition can be discerned by others. We test the model's key assumption with an experiment in which we find that subjects who interacted for thirty minutes before playing one-shot prisoner's dilemmas with two others were substantially more accurate than chance in predicting their partners' decisions.

引用

页码：247 / 256

页数：10

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