ESOPS AND PROFIT-SHARING PLANS - DO THEY LINK EMPLOYEE PAY TO COMPANY PERFORMANCE

被引:8
作者
CONTE, MA [1 ]
KRUSE, D [1 ]
机构
[1] RUTGERS STATE UNIV,INST MANAGEMENT & LABOR RELAT,NEW BRUNSWICK,NJ 08903
关键词
D O I
10.2307/3665715
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
In recent years, there has been increased interest in the impact of pay systems on company performance. However, clear results on the impact of these pay plans have not been achieved. We argue here that stronger results have been elusive because compensation systems which supposedly create a pay/performance linkage often do so only weakly, if at all. In most of the companies that we studied, we find that these nominally performance-contingent pay systems provide less of a financial incentive to the achievement of company-wide performance goals than does basic salary and wage compensation. It is therefore not surprising that empirical studies would find these plans to be mixed in their effectiveness.
引用
收藏
页码:91 / 100
页数:10
相关论文
共 18 条
  • [1] ALCHIAN AA, 1972, AM ECON REV, V62, P777
  • [2] COMPENSATION AND INCENTIVES - PRACTICE VS THEORY
    BAKER, GP
    JENSEN, MC
    MURPHY, KJ
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1988, 43 (03) : 593 - 616
  • [3] Blinder A.S., 1990, PAYING PRODUCTIVITY
  • [4] BRICKLEY JA, 1991, FINANCIAL MANAGE SUM, P70
  • [5] BUSHMAN R, 1991, ACCOUNTING INCOME ST
  • [6] CHANG SY, 1990, FINANCIAL MANAGE SPR, P48
  • [7] CHAPLINSKY S, 1990, FINANCIAL MANAGE SPR, P29
  • [8] CONTE, 1990, PAYING PRODUCTIVITY, P143
  • [9] CONTE MA, 1992, TRENDS PENSIONS 1992
  • [10] JEHRING JJ, 1962, NEW APPROCH COLLECTI