FINITE RATIONALITY AND INTERPERSONAL COMPLEXITY IN REPEATED GAMES

[1] EXTREMAL EQUILIBRIA OF OLIGOPOLISTIC SUPERGAMES [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1986, 39 (01) : 191 - 225

[2] ABREU D, 1984, UNPUB INFINITELY REP

[3] ABREU D, 1986, UNPUB STRUCTURE NASH

[4] AUMANN R, 1985, UNPUB BOUNDED RATION

[5] Aumann R, 1981, ESSAYS GAME THEORY M

[6] EFFECTIVE CHOICE IN THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA [J]. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 1980, 24 (01) : 3 - 25

[7] BENPORATH E, 1986, UNPUB REPEATED GAMES

[8] NON-COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM FOR SUPERGAMES [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1971, 38 (113) : 1 - 12

[9] FUTIA C, 1977, J MATH EC, V4, P289

[10] HARRIS C, 1984, UNPUB NOTE EXISTENCE

[1] EXTREMAL EQUILIBRIA OF OLIGOPOLISTIC SUPERGAMES [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1986, 39 (01) : 191 - 225

[2] ABREU D, 1984, UNPUB INFINITELY REP

[3] ABREU D, 1986, UNPUB STRUCTURE NASH

[4] AUMANN R, 1985, UNPUB BOUNDED RATION

[5] Aumann R, 1981, ESSAYS GAME THEORY M

[6] EFFECTIVE CHOICE IN THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA [J]. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 1980, 24 (01) : 3 - 25

[7] BENPORATH E, 1986, UNPUB REPEATED GAMES

[8] NON-COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM FOR SUPERGAMES [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1971, 38 (113) : 1 - 12

[9] FUTIA C, 1977, J MATH EC, V4, P289

[10] HARRIS C, 1984, UNPUB NOTE EXISTENCE