A RELATIONAL THEORY OF DEFAULT RULES FOR COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS

被引：98

作者：

SCOTT, RE

机构：

来源：

JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES | 1990年 / 19卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/467863

中图分类号：

D9 [法律]; DF [法律];

学科分类号：

0301 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：597 / 616

页数：20

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