THE OPTIMISTIC STABILITY OF THE CORE OF MIXED MARKETS

被引：8

作者：

GREENBERG, J

SHITOVITZ, B

机构：

[1] CRDE,QUEBEC CITY,PQ,CANADA

[2] UNIV HAIFA,HAIFA,ISRAEL

来源：

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS | 1994年 / 23卷 / 04期

基金：

加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;

关键词：

SOCIAL SITUATIONS; OPTIMISTIC STABILITY; CORE; MIXED MARKETS (WITH ATOMS); COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM;

D O I：

10.1016/0304-4068(94)90020-5

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We show that the core mapping of a mixed market is the unique optimistic stable standard of behavior for the core situation. That is, an allocation belongs to the core of a market if and only if there exists no allocation in the core of a submarket that blocks it.

引用

页码：379 / 386

页数：8