AUCTIONS VERSUS POSTED-PRICE SELLING

被引：12

作者：

WANG, RQ

机构：

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1993年 / 83卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Two popular selling methods - posted-price selling and auctions - are compared here in an independent private-values model. Without auctioning costs, auctioning is always optimal. When auctioning is costly, auctions are still preferable if the marginal-revenue curve is sufficiently steep. The global steepness of the marginal-revenue curve is found to coincide with the dispersion around the mean for a number of standard distributions. Finally, the prices of the monopoly seller and of the social optimum are compared.

引用

页码：838 / 851

页数：14

共 16 条

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[4]

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