Contractual union-firm agreements and the theory of the firm under uncertainty

被引：3

作者：

Bughin, J

机构：

[1] Free University of Brussels, Belgium and McKinsey and Company, Bloor Street, 175 East

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 1995年 / 28卷 / 03期

关键词：

union-firm bargaining; uncertainty;

D O I：

10.1016/0167-2681(95)00044-5

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This article analyzes the consequence of introducing union-firm contractual agreements in the theory of the firm under uncertainty. Generalizing the works on the labor-managed firm, it is shown that the risk-averse firm produces more than the risk-neutral firm, or the firm operating under certainty as long as equilibrium employment is negatively related to union wages, that is, when union power over wages is higher than that over employment.

引用

页码：409 / 415

页数：7

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