ON PARETO IMPROVING COMMODITY TAX CHANGES UNDER FISCAL COMPETITION

被引：26

作者：

DECROMBRUGGHE, A

TULKENS, H

机构：

[1] FAC UNIV ST LOUIS,BRUSSELS,BELGIUM

[2] CATHOLIC UNIV LOUVAIN,CORE,B-1348 LOUVAIN LA NEUVE,BELGIUM

来源：

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS | 1990年 / 41卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0047-2727(90)90065-P

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper shows that when a 'non-cooperative fiscal equilibrium' of the Mintz-Tulkens 1986 model of tax competition is inefficient, Pareto improving changes are positive for the taxes of both regions, under concavity of the regions' welfare functions. It also identifies a class of such equilibria that are always efficient. © 1990.

引用

页码：335 / 350

页数：16

共 5 条

[1] Atkinson A.B., 1980, LECTURES PUBLIC EC
[2] AN OPTIMAL TAXATION APPROACH TO FISCAL FEDERALISM
GORDON, RH
[J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 98 (04) : 567 - 586
[3] KEEN M, 1988, J PUBLIC ECON, V33, P107
[4] COMMODITY TAX COMPETITION BETWEEN MEMBER STATES OF A FEDERATION - EQUILIBRIUM AND EFFICIENCY
MINTZ, J
TULKENS, H
[J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1986, 29 (02) : 133 - 172
[5] NASH EQUILIBRIA IN MODELS OF FISCAL COMPETITION
WILDASIN, DE
[J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1988, 35 (02) : 229 - 240

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