TOWARD A THEORY OF COMPETITIVE MARKET SIGNALING - A RESEARCH AGENDA

被引：241

作者：

HEIL, O ^{[1
]}

ROBERTSON, TS ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV PENN,WHARTON SCH,PHILADELPHIA,PA 19104

来源：

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL | 1991年 / 12卷 / 06期

关键词：

COMPETITIVE MARKET SIGNALS; COMPETITIVE REACTION;

D O I：

10.1002/smj.4250120602

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Competitive market signals are conceptualized as announcements or previews of potential actions intended to convey or to gain information from competitors. This paper develops a set of propositions based on research in economics, social psychology, and marketing on the risk/reward trade‐off in signaling, the receiver's signal interpretation, and the receiver's reaction alternatives. The overall objective is to develop a research agenda toward a theory of competitive market signaling. Copyright © 1991 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

引用

页码：403 / 418

页数：16

共 76 条

[1]

ABELL DF, 1979, STRATEGIC MARKET PLA

[2] DIMENSIONS OF CONSUMER EXPERTISE [J].