ON THE THEORY OF REPEATED GAMES WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION .2. REVELATION THROUGH COMMUNICATION

被引：4

作者：

MATSUSHIMA, H

机构：

[1] Institute of Socio-Economic Planning, University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba, Ibaraki

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1991年 / 35卷 / 03期

基金：

日本学术振兴会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(91)90140-G

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider repeated games with private information, discounting and communication. Similarly to Abreu et al. (1986, 1987), we characterize supergame-equilibrium allocations with truthful revelation. In the two-player case, efficiency cannot be attained with supergame equilibria with truthful revelation. © 1991.

引用

页码：257 / 261

页数：5

共 9 条

[1] OPTIMAL CARTEL EQUILIBRIA WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING [J].