STRATEGYPROOF COLLECTIVE CHOICE IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTS

被引：66

作者：

SPRUMONT, Y

机构：

来源：

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-REVUE CANADIENNE D ECONOMIQUE | 1995年 / 28卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/136023

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper surveys some recent results characterizing strategyproof collective choice rules when preferences satisfy conditions that are meaningful in economic or political environments.

引用

页码：68 / 107

页数：40

共 52 条

[1]

ALCALDE J, 1994, EC THEORY, V3, P417

[2]

[Anonymous], 1988, AXIOMS COOPERATIVE D, DOI DOI 10.1017/CCOL0521360552

[3] VOTING BY COMMITTEES [J].

BARBERA, S ;

SONNENSCHEIN, H ;

ZHOU, L .

ECONOMETRICA, 1991, 59 (03) :595-609

[4]

BARBERA S, 1994, SOC CHOICE WELFARE, V11, P241

[5] STRATEGY-PROOF VOTING SCHEMES WITH CONTINUOUS PREFERENCES [J].

BARBERA, S ;

PELEG, B .

SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 1990, 7 (01) :31-38

[6]

BARBERA S, 1993, UNPUB STRATEGY PROOF

[7]

BARBERA S, 1993, UNPUB VOTING CONSTRA

[8]

BARBERA S, 1994, J ECON THEORY, V61, P262

[9] ARROW AND GIBBARD-SATTERTHWAITE REVISITED - EXTENDED DOMAINS AND SHORTER PROOFS [J].

BEJA, A .

MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 1993, 25 (03) :281-286

[10] ON THE RATIONALE OF GROUP DECISION-MAKING [J].

Black, Duncan .

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1948, 56 (01) :23-34

← 1 2 3 4 5 6 →