THE POLITICS OF GOVERNMENT DECISION-MAKING - A THEORY OF REGULATORY CAPTURE

被引：469

作者：

LAFFONT, JJ ^{[1
]}

TIROLE, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] MIT,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02139

来源：

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1991年 / 106卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2937958

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The paper develops an agency-theoretic approach to interest-group politics and shows the following: (1) the organizational response to the possibility of regulatory agency polities is to reduce the stakes interest groups have in regulation. (2) The threat of producer protection leads to low-powered incentive schemes for regulated firms. (3) Consumer politics may induce uniform pricing by a multiproduct firm. (4) An interest group has more power when its interest lies in inefficient rather than efficient regulation, where inefficiency is measured by the degree of informational asymmetry between the regulated industry and the political principal (Congress).

引用

页码：1089 / 1127

页数：39

共 33 条

[1]

Adams G., 1981, POLITICS DEFENSE CON

[2]

BARKE RP, 1982, PUBLIC CHOICE, V39, P73

[3] REGULATING A MONOPOLIST WITH UNKNOWN COSTS [J].