BAYESIAN INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE BELIEFS

被引：36

作者：

DASPREMONT, C

GERARDVARET, LA

机构：

[1] UNIV STRASBOURG 1,F-67084 STRASBOURG,FRANCE

[2] UNIV AIX MARSEILLE 3,F-13621 AIX EN PROVENCE,FRANCE

[3] UNIV BONN,INST GESELLSCH & WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCH,D-5300 BONN,FED REP GER

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0304-4068(82)90007-6

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：83 / 103

页数：21

共 15 条

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[3] INCENTIVES AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
DASPREMONT, C
GERARDVARET, LA
[J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1979, 11 (01) : 25 - 45
[4] DASPREMONT C, 1975, CORE DP7519 U CATH L
[5] FAN K, 1956, LINEAR INEQUALITIES
[6] GREEN J, 1977, ECONOMETRICA, V45, P783
[7] GREEN J, 1979, INCENTIVES PUBLIC DE
[8] Groves T, 1975, J PUBLIC ECON, V4, P211, DOI DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(75)90001-8
[9] RESOURCE-ALLOCATION UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
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[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (01) : 33 - 64
[10] GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION PLAYED BY BAYESIAN PLAYERS .2. BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM POINTS
HARSANYI, JC
[J]. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1968, 14 (05) : 320 - 334