On the neutral stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests

被引：3

作者：

Bhaskar, V ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] DELHI SCH ECON, DELHI, INDIA

来源：

MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES | 1995年 / 30卷 / 03期

关键词：

evolutionary game theory; instability of mixed strategies;

D O I：

10.1016/0165-4896(95)00797-0

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Although a mixed strategy can never be evolutionary stable in a truly asymmetric contest, examples show that mixed strategies can satisfy the weaker criterion of neutral stability. This paper shows that such examples are rare, and, generically, a mixed strategy is unstable. We apply our result to the battle of the sexes between males and females over the raising of offspring.

引用

页码：273 / 284

页数：12

共 18 条

[1]

[Anonymous], 2016, SELFISH GENE

[2]

BHASKAR V, 1994, 94112 CENTER EC RES

[3] EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY IN REPEATED GAMES PLAYED BY FINITE AUTOMATA [J].