CYCLIC SETS IN MULTIDIMENSIONAL VOTING MODELS

被引：59

作者：

COHEN, L

机构：

[1] John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1979年 / 20卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(79)90059-0

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Simple majority rule usually does not yield an unambiguous consistent outcome. Assuming a characterization of the set of potential outcomes as Rn and an odd number of voters with quasiconcave preferences, a unique, nonempty set of majority rule cycles exists. Sufficient conditions are established for the top cycle set to encompass the entire policy space. Generalized quadratic utility functions satisfy these conditions. © 1979.

引用

页码：1 / 12

页数：12