DECENTRALIZED, DISPERSED EXCHANGE WITHOUT AN AUCTIONEER - A SIMULATION STUDY

被引：46

作者：

ALBIN, P ^{[1
]}

FOLEY, DK ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] COLUMBIA UNIV,NEW YORK,NY 10027

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 1992年 / 18卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0167-2681(92)90051-C

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We stimulate exchange among geographically dispersed agents who face real costs of communication along with bounds to rationality and calculation. Exchange is entirely decentralized: it is initiated by individual agents who broadcast costly messages indicating their interest in trade; it is accomplished by bilateral bargaining between pairs of agents; agents use the information gained from previous attempts at local trade to calculate their search strategies for succeeding rounds. This decentralized mechanism can achieve a substantial improvement in the allocation of resources and the average welfare of agents in comparison with a randomized initial endowment. But in comparison with Walrasian equilibrium agents who begin with endowments of equal value end up with substantially unequal wealth, although the initial inequality of utility is reduced.

引用

页码：27 / 51

页数：25

共 15 条

[1]

ALBIN PS, 1989, FINANCIAL DYNAMICS AND BUSINESS CYCLES, P168

[2] MICROECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF CYCLICAL IRREGULARITIES OR CHAOS [J].