EQUILIBRIUM REFINEMENT IN PSYCHOLOGICAL GAMES

被引：8

作者：

KOLPIN, V

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, University of Oregon, Eugene

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1992年 / 4卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0899-8256(92)90016-L

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Psychological games are structures in which a player's "belief-dependent emotions" may affect realized utility. We show that these mechanisms can be modeled as conventional games, thus traditional game-theoretic intuition is applicable. Equilibrium refinements are investigated. When formulated so that beliefs reflect sensitivity to the "trembles" of competitors, perfect and even proper equilibria of psychological games are shown to exist. © 1992.

引用

页码：218 / 231

页数：14