EFFICIENT BILATERAL TRADE WITH STATISTICALLY DEPENDENT BELIEFS

被引：5

作者：

GRESIK, TA

机构：

[1] John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University, St. Louis

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1991年 / 53卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(91)90149-X

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper derives a necessary and sufficient condition for ex post efficient trade to be feasible when trader beliefs can be statistically dependent. Allowing for dependent beliefs produces equilibrium and comparative statics behavior that differs qualitatively from that observed in bilateral trade models in which traders have independent beliefs. © 1991.

引用

收藏

页码：199 / 205

页数：7

相关论文

共 13 条

[1] BARGAINING WITH 2-SIDED INCOMPLETE INFORMATION - AN INFINITE HORIZON MODEL WITH ALTERNATING OFFERS [J].

CHATTERJEE, K ;

SAMUELSON, L .

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1987, 54 (02) :175-192

[2] DISSOLVING A PARTNERSHIP EFFICIENTLY [J].

CRAMTON, P ;

GIBBONS, R ;

KLEMPERER, P .

ECONOMETRICA, 1987, 55 (03) :615-632

[3] OPTIMAL SELLING STRATEGIES UNDER UNCERTAINTY FOR A DISCRIMINATING MONOPOLIST WHEN DEMANDS ARE INTERDEPENDENT [J].

CREMER, J ;

MCLEAN, RP .

ECONOMETRICA, 1985, 53 (02) :345-361

[4] FULL EXTRACTION OF THE SURPLUS IN BAYESIAN AND DOMINANT STRATEGY AUCTIONS [J].

CREMER, J ;

MCLEAN, RP .

ECONOMETRICA, 1988, 56 (06) :1247-1257

[5] SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION [J].

FUDENBERG, D ;

TIROLE, J .

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1983, 50 (02) :221-247

[6]

GRESIK T, 1986, THESIS NW U

[7] EX ANTE EFFICIENT, EX POST INDIVIDUALLY RATIONAL TRADE [J].

GRESIK, TA .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1991, 53 (01) :131-145

[8] ON INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE, INDIVIDUALLY RATIONAL, AND EX POST EFFICIENT MECHANISMS FOR BILATERAL TRADING [J].

MATSUO, T .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1989, 49 (01) :189-194

[9]

MCAFEE R, 1989, CORRELATED INFORMATI

[10] EFFICIENT MECHANISMS FOR BILATERAL TRADING [J].

MYERSON, RB ;

SATTERTHWAITE, MA .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1983, 29 (02) :265-281